Flashback: Boeing’s 2012 737 Replacement Study

737RS.jpgOnce upon a time, before a single 787 barrel had been wrapped, Boeing let itself dream big about the future of the 737. Not to say that the big dreaming stopped, but it was just over taken by the engineering need on 787 and a massively growing 737 backlog between 2006-2008 that pushed the need for a replacement to the early part of the next decade.

Had Boeing gone ahead with the 737RS, today we would be just two to five years away from entry into service. The 737RS was part of Project 20XX, which spawned the Sonic Cruiser and 787 initial technology studies, and broke down Boeing’s future ambition into three categories: Y1, Y2 and Y3. Y1, the 100-200 seat market, was the 737 replacement. Y2, the 200-350 seat replacement, is what we know as the 787. Y3 at 350-450 seats covered the 777 market.
Mike Cave, now president of Boeing Capital Corporation, was appointed as the study’s director in 2006. At the time, not much was known about Boeing’s 737RS plans, more than that the aircraft was set to be a mini-787:

According to industrial sources, Boeing has accelerated the pace of the 737RS study effort and even plans to make its initial pass on prospective supplier teams by mid-2006. The RS/Y1 concept is based around an all-composite 787-like structure, fly-by-wire, more-electric system architecture, EVS-integrated avionics flightdeck, and a cabin cross-section “wider than A320”. Aerodynamic improvements include a longer span wing, single-slotted flaps, raked and blended-winglet wingtip options, blended fin root and 787-like Section 41 (nose and flightdeck).

Airbus launched its own NSR (new single aisle replacement) study and reached similar conclusions about what a 2012 narrowbody replacement could provide for gains in efficiency.

Initial results from both NSR and RS/Y1 studies have, apparently, been less than stellar. Acting completely independently, the two studies have come up with similar results for their individual concepts, which fall far short of the ideal targets set for the 2012 timeframe airliner.

Airbus NSR Phase 1 results, for example, are believed to have indicated that if all the advanced technology (available and considered mature and sufficiently low-risk for entry into service in 2012) was poured into the aircraft, the best specific fuel consumption reduction would be 4%, the best operating cost reduction 3% and the best emissions reduction would be 5%. The numbers are also said to be within 0.5-1% for all parameters for the initial phases of Boeing’s RS/Y1.

These results therefore mean the aggregate benefit of all the combined results indicates a maximum efficiency improvement of only around 9-10% over the current A320/737 models. Given the estimated $7 billion development pricetag (airframe, systems and engine technology) involved in the NSR, insiders say Airbus in particular is asking if the venture is “too much, too soon”.

Then, like now, the engine technology was the driving factor in getting narrowbody efficiency gains of 20%. However, as Boeing and Airbus target 15% improvement with re-engined 737s and A320s, next generation engine technology found in the LEAP-X, PW1000G and RB285 has provided a 50% boost in efficiency expectations from the RS/Y1 & NSR original studies. 

Though does this create a dilemma down the road for Airbus and Boeing? If 10-15% gains in efficiency can be yielded with a re-engining program on existing models for a mid-decade entry into service, is an additional 5% over today’s aircraft for a replacement 202X (a total gain of 20%) enough to justify the development of a completely new aircraft type? To really make mark, do the 202X replacements really need 30-35% improvement gains over today’s aircraft?
A leap too far?

This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.

This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.