This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.

This is the last in a three part series on the development of Boeing’s all-new jetliner. Part three places the business model Boeing may employ under the microscope as it learns from its past mistakes on the 787. Last Monday’s Part One looked at market evaluations and the configuration and materials selection process and last Tuesday’s Part Two looked at how Boeing will make the 20% leap in fuel efficiency in its new jet and what new advanced technologies are under consideration.
Though central to the development of an all-new aircraft is how Boeing chooses to industrialize the project and how it bridges the transition with its current 737 product line, which it expects to continue for decades to come.
With 843 sales, his goal is to replicate the 787’s market success, while avoiding its pitfalls. Designing a plane that meets market requirements is part of Boeing’s pedigree, though configuring a new jet is just as important as crafting and executing the right business model to avoid the mistakes of its predecessor.
Bair was one of the chief architects – and the original program manager – of the original 787 business plan that horizontally integrated supply partners, shifting both design and manufacturing responsibility away from Boeing, a model that has served up an excruciating lesson for the airframer with years of delays and billions of dollars of overuns on the program.
“I have a lot of scars, so I know what not to do this time around,” says Bair who was replaced as program chief in October 2007 by now-vice president of airplane programs, Pat Shanahan.
Boeing has embraced its mea culpa attitude about its 787 woes, reflecting on its mistakes and generating headlines that reflect its contrition about the events of the past three years. While acknowledging its past mistakes is absolutely essential, not repeating them remains uncompromisingly more vital.
Specifically, Bair points to making the overall program schedule less aggressive and “adjusting the partner model” to meet a 2019 or 2020 entry into service for the new jet while avoiding the mistakes of the past.
“We went too far on the 87, and it cost us,” he says of the partner model that initially saw all major structural components, save for the aircraft’s vertical tail, built by supply partners.
Bair says Boeing is “not undoing [the partner model],” and adds “There’s a lot of instances where it worked just the way we wanted it to, but there were too many where it didn’t. So being more thoughtful and given the experience we’ve had on the ’87’, making sure we use that as we put together whatever the partner model is going to be on this airplane.”
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.

This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
Television interpretations of aviation accident investigations can be prone to hyperbole and hysteria. By contrast, NOVA’s independent investigation of Air France 447 avoids the traditional pitfalls of other docudrama-style programs. This week’s Movie Monday offers some interesting insights and breaks new ground about what may’ve happened to the Airbus A330-200 on its flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in June 2009. Today’s program runs 53min in seven parts.
Watch the full episode. See more NOVA.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
Boeing and FedEx Express are closely examining developing a new build freighter based on the 767-400ER, offering a production bridge to the recently awarded KC-46A tanker.
Company and industry sources confirm the discussions, which are geared toward providing a replacement to the 72 MD-10s currently in the logistics company’s fleet.
Boeing declined to offer specific confirmation, saying “We are always in discussions with our customers about their future requirements. We don’t share specifics of those discussions publicly.”
FedEx declined to comment, saying “we do not discuss the nature or content of any private discussions we have with vendors or customers.”
The size of a potential launch order is not clear, though on a one-to-one basis, the 58 MD-10-10F and 16 MD-10-30F aircraft in the company’s fleet would provide fertile ground to launch such a program.
Additionally, development and production of a 767-400ERF is believed to be intended as a production bridge between the 49 outstanding 767 orders and the start of initial KC-46A tanker production, allowing the existing production system to continue uninterrupted.
Of the 49 outstanding 767 orders, there are 24 767-300ERs and 25 767-300Fs.
Boeing plans the first flight of a KC-46A in 2015, followed by achievement of initial operational capability with the US Air Force with 18 aircraft by 2017. The KC-X tanker contract, awarded to Boeing last week, worth as much as $35 billion will replace the USAF fleet of 179 KC-135 tanker aircraft.
The aircraft, equipped with winglets and a 787-derived flight deck will be assembled on the company’s newly relocated lean 767 final assembly line inside the rear of its Everett, Washington factory.
Boeing Defense Systems CEO Dennis Muilenburg said he expected the KC-X award would spur commercial interest in the 767.
The passenger version of the 767-400ER, introduced in 2000, was a slow seller and was supplanted directly in the company’s product line with the launch of the 787-8 and -9.
The airframer delivered 37 aircraft intended for commercial use, including 16 to then-Continental Airlines and 21 to Delta Air Lines from 2000 and 2002, with one additional VIP configured aircraft in January 2009.
The performance of a 767-400ERF is currently unclear, though FedEx was previously working closely with Boeing to develop a freighter conversion program for low-cycle 777-200 and -200ERs, also intended for MD-10 replacement.
A launch decision for the 777-200BCF/200ERBCF was expected in the first
half of 2011, and a further delay could follow as FedEx evaluates the 767-400ERF.
FedEx announced earlier this week that it may eventually order up to 55 new build 777-200LRF aircraft and already has 12 in its fleet.
Original Photo Credit Moonm
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
I wish this wasn’t becoming a frequent topic of discussion here, though if you’ve tried to comment on any Flightglobal blogs in the last several months you’ve realized that getting comments posted is not as seamless as it should be. Our technical team in London is working to solve this issue for a broader solution that stems from the unimaginable amount of spam that is thrown at this blog and others.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.

This is the second in a three part series on the development of
Boeing’s all-new jetliner. Part two examines how Boeing will make the 20% leap in fuel efficiency in its new jet and what new advanced technologies are under consideration. Monday’s Part One looked at market evaluations and the
configuration and materials selection process and
Wednesday’s Part Three will look at the future production system and
business model of the new jet.
Once the question of ‘what the market wants’ is answered and materials have been selected, Boeing must get under the skin and on to the wing of its new aircraft to define what technologies can meet the performance the market demands. Among those items on the table are an advanced bleed architecture pneumatic system, fly-by-light flight control system, adaptive wings and the latest developments from three major engine makers, only two of which will likely be offered on the new jet.
The question when developing a new jetliner comes down to what levers does Boeing pull to deliver 10% improved cash operating costs and a 20% improvement in fuel burn over the 737 Next Generation. As a point of comparison, of the 20% improvement in fuel burn promised by the 787, ±8% comes from the engines, ±3% from the systems, ±3% from the structures and ±3% from aerodynamic efficiency.
From a pure cash perspective on short-to-medium haul missions, the cost of fuel tends to be only 25% of the cost verses 50% on a long-range mission, requiring Boeing to find other ways to reduce the overall non-fuel operating cost of the aircraft. However, that share is likely to climb as the price of oil steadily increases.
Mike Bair, vice president of Advanced 737 Product Development, says Boeing is working closely with CFM, Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney to identify the airframer’s engine options for a new jet.
“All three of them have given us what they think they can do for an engine that comes into service in [2019 or 2020], and it’s better than what they could do for a [2015 or 2016 entry into service],” he says, an allusion to improved performance compare to the Bombardier CS300 and Airbus A320neo.
Bair also says it’s Boeing preference to move away from the exclusivity agreements currently arranged with CFM International on the 737 Next Generation, providing a choice of two engines on the new aircraft.
“Our sort of fundamental assumption is that we would provide a choice,” though Bair adds “If there’s reasons you have an opportunity where a sole source makes sense, then you evaluate it.”
Citing the experience early on in the development of the 737 Next Generation, “we were interested in having the [International Aero Engines] V2500 on the airplane. They were unwilling to do something about their fan,” he says.
One industry official believes that one spot is likely reserved for the CFM Leap-X, the incumbent engine supplier on today’s 737, with the second slot in competition between the Pratt & Whitney PW1000G geared turbofan and Rolls-Royce Advance2 and Advance3 engines.
Aside from fuel burn improvements, Bair says “we have opportunities on all fronts” to improve the maintenance cost of the aircraft by driving up reliability and asset utilization. In a general sense, the material choices that Boeing makes, as well as the aircraft configuration and cross section will guide maintainability and daily utilization.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This is the first in a three part series on the development of Boeing’s all-new jetliner. Part one examines market evaluations and the configuration and materials selection process. Tuesday’s Part Two will explore the aircraft’s systems, propulsion and performance and Wednesday’s Part Three will look at the future production system and business model of the new jet.
Until now, few answers about Boeing’s next aircraft have been available and while the majority of its attributes have yet to be determined – including its launch – the all-new jet will be one aircraft, not two, and whose configuration will match the familiar tube and wing that defines commercial air transport today.
In recent months, Boeing has been quietly polling the worlds most influential airlines, offering them a veritable “grab-bag” of technologies, say industry officials, with the goal of identifying their future needs for an all new jet that is intended to first see revenue service in 2019 or 2020.
The task Boeing is now preparing itself to undertake – the development of the airframer’s next generation narrowbody – is now in the early planning phases. By the Paris Air Show in June, Boeing will announce the direction its intends to advance, deciding between an all-new design or a re-engined 737.
If Boeing can replicate the design resiliency of the original 1967 737-100 and -200, then “getting it right” now means laying the groundwork for an aircraft that will evolve well into the latter half of the 21st century. Boeing has succeeded in evolving the 737, making incremental improvements to the aircraft over time, without having to make the multi-billion dollar investment to fully replace the narrowbody, all while maintaining its existing industrial footprint for ever increasing production.
Despite that longevity, what the market doesn’t appear to want, says Mike Bair, vice president of Advanced 737 Product Development, is a re-engined 737: “I kind of characterize it as more underwhelmed than overwhelmed and almost all of them want to know what more we can do with a new airplane, so that’s kind of where our focus is right now.”
Though standing in the path of the all-new aircraft are significant unanswered questions about the commercial success of the 787 and what technology from its long-range twin can be used in a smaller platform. In charge of this effort is Bair, who first must answer the question from which all other answers will be yielded: What does the market want?
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.