EVERETT — With 787 functionality and reliability (F&R) testing entering what is likely its final six or seven days, Airplane Nine, ZA102, seems to be spending more time in the air than it is on the ground. The aircraft flew five different missions Friday covering three full blocks of testing, which ZA102 is expected to repeat again on Saturday. I captured the jet as it was departing on its fifth flight of the day, and the clip above should give a good sense of the 787’s acoustic properties – or possibly lack thereof. 

Travel Day: BOS-IAH-SEA, originally uploaded by flightblogger.

When RC523 landed in the early morning Wednesday hours following a 17 hour maximum endurance flight, the arrival marked the completion of the aircraft’s functionality and reliability (F&R) trials and more importantly the final test of the jumbo freighter’s certification campaign. Earlier in the day, RC522 returned to Paine Field in the later afternoon having completed final certification tests on the aircraft Honeywell-build flight management computer (FMC).

With all the discussion about the now seemingly uncertain future for Renton and its role on the re-engined 737, set off by comments yesterday from the company’s CEO, it’s important to note how the line achieved the status of “one of the great aerospace factories in the world.” The credit, in large measure goes to Carolyn Corvi, who until 2008 was Boeing Commercial Airplanes vice president of Airplane Programs. 

Albaugh: We need to look hard at what we can do within the four walls [of the Renton factory] and if the demand is there we’ll have to look at: do you need to build a new factory and where might you put it? But we’re getting way ahead of ourselves we just made the announcement to do it, we made the decision to do it a few weeks ago, but in the event that we need more capacity we’ll look and made the best decision for Boeing.

Ken Herbert, Wedbush Securities: You’ve talked about narrow body rates now a few times getting to a 50-60 range, as you think about the cost profile of this program, how should we think about understanding considering some of the limitations up in Renton. How narrow body production may evolve to potentially support, to maintain some of your margin while at the same time looking at some of the rates you’ve thrown out there the next five to ten years:

Boeing CEO Jim McNerney: We haven’t made the final decision on where we’re going to produce the re-engined airplane, your question implies though that after the 42 per month, we do run into some challenges if Renton were the choice, some capital expenditures there to increase it. But we have other options and we’re going to study them all as we think it through. But, demand could easily be that high in the timeframe we’re talking about and the good news is we have options.

KH: To what extent could South Carolina step in and meet some of that demand for you?

JM: It would depend as we studied it for how competitive they could be as compared to a Renton or compared to another site, if we would study it all and come up with a decision that would make the most sense for our customers and the company.

Continuing later on…

And depending on how it goes [in South Carolina], we’ll have to see how competitive the factory is. We’re going to invest to make it as competitive as we can. But I think it’s fair to say, just getting the 87 done over then next few years is a big challenge and we are going to succeed. But over the next few years, I don’t want to dilute the effort down there with other new airplanes right away, so it could be an option down the road on re-engine, it’s not at the top of the list right now.”

Dominic Gates, Seattle Times: I’m a little surprised to hear you opening up this option, you hope to produce 50 to 60 narrowbodies but the end of the decade per month, so you’re now talking about not doing the re-engine in Renton, that seems like such a surprising thing to bring up. You’ve got your most efficient line of all your aircraft programs, you’ve actually got a third line – which does have the complication of being an ITAR line – but it seems like in Renton you do have all the options you could possibly want to make that airplane there. Are you seriously considering doing a re-engining somewhere else? Charleston doesn’t even do metal airplanes, or is this a matter of just trying to keep your options open. And what’s the effect on morale of the Renton workforce when you raise this, what’d I have to call a spectre, of putting work elsewhere?

JM: Well listen, Renton is one of the great aerospace factories in the world, obviously, the idea of putting a lot of work, a lot of narrowbodies there is very attractive, I think the spirit which I was answering the question was: Until we have sorted out the milestones associated with the ramp up, the degree to which we have to modify the airplane, there would be major investments in Renton, beyond the currently planned for production rates. Until we sort that all out we can’t confirm where we’re going to put it precisely. But would putting it in renton be a good option? Yes.

DG: All your supply chain converges on Renton. To put it somewhere else means having Wichita send it elsewhere. It seems like more investment to do it elsewhere.

JM: I think until we study it all…Renton has a strong case, but again, Dominic, there is significant investment that we’d have to make some place beyond the current rates that we’re contemplating and until we understand exactly what the plane will be and what rate we have to build it, I think we have to study that and figure it out.

With final certification submittals to the US Federal Aviation Administration in sight, Boeing aims to deliver the first 787 to Japan’s All Nippon Airways around the third week of September, but is not likely to deliver more than five or six 787s before the close of the year, say company and industry sources, who say the slow pace of progress of reworking and outfitting each airframe is taking longer than expected.

Further, ahead of a planned critical program review in the late summer or early fall, an entry into service slip of the larger 787-9 appears almost certain, say company, supplier, industry sources pushing handover to of the first aircraft to launch customer Air New Zealand into the first half of 2014 with an additional delay of three to six months, due to a slower than expected pace of design, possibly paired with a more modest production ramp up.

Sources on both sides of the US say that completion of the 787’s aft body has been of particular focus during the delivery hold, which is expected to expire in early August.

“The adjustment is due to a few production areas in the supply chain experiencing temporary challenges related to spot parts shortages and remaining engineering change incorporation,” says Boeing.

Going into the month-long delivery hold, the first shipsets for the newly opened Charleston final assembly were the first to be delivered with 100% completion of assembly, the first in the program’s history.

While on its surface an extremely positive development for a program that has worked for years to eliminate incomplete shipsets, multiple sources confirm that both Airplane 45 had considerably lower completion in comparison to earlier aircraft, and Airplane 47 – which has not yet been delivered to Everett – was expected to carry considered travelled work before the delivery halt.

The cause, say those with direct familiarity in Everett and Charleston, stemmed from Airplanes 45 and 47 being “cannibalized” for Airplane 46’s completion.

Boeing says: “We’re not confirming supplier by supplier details, nor completion of assembly by line number.” 

While Boeing has sought to take advantage of lean manufacturing techniques built into the production system, the reality, and the uneveness of completion, illustrates how the lean processes have been hard to meet deeper in the supply chain.

Notably, that as completion of assembly decreases and work is pushed later in the supply chain or even to final assembly, those responsible for the task completion are denied the opportunity to learn a steady repetition in their statement of work, say those with direct familiarity with the 787’s production system.

Though the 787 final assembly line in Everett is definitively improving say company sources, citing Airplane 40 as an important turning point, with the first to have all of its flight controls – including long-missing flaps – installed before leaving the factory, along with its auxiliary power unit.

Despite the steady improvement the unevenness in production, and the amount of rework required on Airplanes ahead of 40, highlight how aerospace manufacturing systems “learn” at different rates.

The industry standard places the “curve” at around 85%. An 85% learning curve denotes for every doubling of production, the cost of each completed aircraft is reduced by another 15%.

For example, if the first item is at the top of the learning curve costs $1, the second will cost $.85 to produce. The fourth will cost 85% of the second at $.72, and the eighth 85% of fourth.

“The 85% learning curve is kind of the text book long-range average,” says Scott Fancher, 787 vice president and general manager, “But in fact, when we look at our database of actual learning curves across many programs, you see quite a wide variation.”

“It really depends upon the automation, the maturity of that automation the complexity of the structure being put together, the quality and the experience of workforce and the training of the workforce.

“It’s hard to draw conclusions about what you would expect on 787 from that number,” he adds.

In areas that have seen very little traveled work and not had a lot of design changes, Fancher says, “our productivity and quality numbers are better than our projections, we’re very pleased the way that aspect is coming together.”

When asked if those areas were exceeding the 85% textbook curve, Fancher would only say “They’re doing better than our projections” without offering specifics.