In the 15 days since ZA002, Boeing’s second of six 787 flight test aircraft, suffered a fire in its aft electrical equipment bay, forcing a fleet-wide halt in certification testing, the airframer is days, if not hours, away from releasing its findings of its investigation and disclosing the impact to the aircraft’s first delivery, say company and industry sources.

An additional delay to the 787’s entry into service with All Nippon Airways is now a virtual certainty, the length of that delay, however, is yet unknown.

While some analysts have suggested the 787’s first delivery could slip to 2012, an additional delay of more than nine months, Boeing’s previous six delays have never shifted the schedule more than six months at a time. A six month slide beyond today’s February 2011 plan would place handover to ANA around August of 2011, more than three years after its original target.

Equally important in establishing the root cause of the fire, reported to be foreign object debris (FOD) that caused a short in the panel, is ensuring primary electrical system redundancy remains intact if such an incident were to reoccur. One program source indicates FOD clogging an air duct that cools the P100 panel may be a culprit.

The Seattle Times, citing a source close to the program, reported the 787 fleet, including 23 production aircraft in Everett, have been searched for FOD.

Though the fire, which happened while on approach to Laredo, Texas, and its root cause, revealed an Achillies heel in the 787’s electrical system that must be resolved before the Dreamliner can enter service.

In an internal message to program employees last week, Scott Fancher, 787 program manager and general manager said “we have made good progress in replicating the effects in our integration labs”.

While the specific “effects” have not been disclosed, under normal operation, a drop out of the P100 panel, feeding electricity from the left engine’s twin variable frequency starter generators (VSFG) to aircraft systems, should have compensated by prioritizing the flow of electricity from the right VSFGs into the healthy P200 panel for distribution. Instead, the fire caused 787 to perceive it had lost electrical power completely, causing the Hamilton Sundstrand-built ram air turbine (RAT) to deploy.

The RAT supplies just 10 kVA of electricity, a fraction of the up to 1.45 megawatts of power generated by the aircraft’s primary systems, including the APS-5000 auxiliary power unit (APU). Sources familiar with the incident say the APU, which supplies power to the P150 power distribution panel, was not running at the time of the fire.

The result, was the loss of four of five, heads down displays (HDD) and the twin heads up displays (HUD), as well as autothrottle control and a “cascading” series of failures.

However, Boeing concluded that with its twin Trent 1000 engines still running, ZA002 was “in a configuration that could have been sustained for the time required to return to an airport suitable for landing from any point in a typical 787 mission profile,” a defense of the 2008 Federal Aviation Administration’s special condition imposed on the aircraft’s electrical system, as well as its sought-after extended twin engine operations (ETOPS) certification.

Since their November 9 grounding, Boeing has received permission from the FAA to relocate three 787s. ZA001 and ZA005 returned to Boeing Field from remote testing in South Dakota and California, respectively, and ZA004 was ferried to the company’s Everett facility for maintenance.

Fancher added “re-positioning these airplanes back to Seattle will better prepare us for any modification that are needed as a result of this event.”

The extent of those modifications is another unknown and covers a wide spectrum of possibilities from a limited software modification all the way to complete redesign of the more-electric systems architecture of the 787.

At its inception, the Boeing used the 787 to push the outer envelope aerospace manufacturing, materials and systems, the three attributes that define an aircraft’s development.

The airframer had encountered great pain with the 787’s globally distributed supply chain in 2007 and 2008, a composite structural flaw in the aircraft’s side-of-body in 2009, and now in 2010 a potentially significant change to the aircraft’s electrical system.

Late discovery of design changes following treacherous incidents is not new to Boeing commercial development programs. 

Nearly 28 years to the day earlier, the third of five 757 flight test aircraft suffered severe engine damage during a natural ice build up test on its Rolls-Royce RB211 engines, 

An FAA representative onboard the aircraft, which was also being co-piloted by an FAA pilot, said at the time of the incident remarked: “We almost lost one.”

The incident prompted a late design change engine that was not validated by the FAA until nearly the last minutes before the type was handed over to Eastern Airlines in late 1982, followed by its January 1983 entry into service. 

HONG KONG — In an customer memorandum dated Wednesday, November 17, Airbus’s Toulouse-based Flight Safety Department issued an incremental update to its findings on Qantas Flight 32. The brief memo is a clear, if not directly stated, defense of the A380’s redundancy following the QF32 investigation into the uncontained failure of the aircraft’s number two Trent 900 engine.

The report also adds additional technical color on the state of the aircraft after the engine failure and its publication comes a day after other internal Airbus reports were leaked illustrating the extent of the damage sustained by VH-OQA.

A380 / RR TRENT 900 – QANTAS VH-OQA INCIDENT ON 4th NOVEMBER 2010.

FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE

Subject: A380 / RR Trent 900 – Qantas VH-OQA incident on 4th November 2010

Our ref.: QF32 AIT 3, dated 17th November 2010

This AIT is an update of the AIT 2 following the in-flight engine failure during flight QF32 from Singapore to Sydney, on 4th November 2010.

This AIT has been approved for release by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) who leads the on-going ICAO Annex 13 investigation.

The second RR inspection program applicable to the Trent 900 engine family and covered by EASA Engine Airworthiness Directive has been published allowing continuous operations of the fleet. Together with its partners, Airbus is providing support to the operators for engine logistics to minimize interruptions to the fleet.

One single high energy fragment is considered from a certification requirement viewpoint. The damage assessment has established that the IPT disk released 3 different high energy fragments, resulting in some structural and systems damage, with associated ECAM warnings. Therefore the crew had to manage a dynamic situation.

Despite the situation, amongst the various available systems supporting the crew to operate the aircraft and return safely to Singapore were:

– Flaps remained available (slats were jammed retracted).

– All flight control surfaces remained available on the pitch and yaw axis.

– The roll control was ensured through: (a) on the left wing: inner aileron, spoilers 1, 3, 5 and 7; (b) on the right wing: mid and inner ailerons, spoilers 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7.

– The flight control laws reverted to Alternate law due to the loss of the slats and of some roll control surfaces. Normal law was kept on longitudinal and lateral axes.

– Flight envelope protections were still active.

– The autopilot was kept engaged till about 700 feet Radio Altimeter, time at which the crew took over manually. Flight Directors were ON.

– Manual control of engines 1, 3 & 4 was maintained till aircraft stop.

– Landing in SIN took place about 1 hour 40 minutes after the engine 2 failure with flaps in
configuration 3.

– Normal braking was available on both body landing gears with antiskid, and alternate braking without antiskid on both wing landing gears. The crew modulated braking in order to stop close to emergency services.

– After the aircraft came to a stop, the reason engine 1 could not be shut down has been determined: 2 segregated wiring routes were cut by 2 out of the 3 individual disk debris.

Airbus continues to work in support of the on-going investigation to complete the detailed analysis.

An update to operators will be provided as soon as further consolidated information is available.

Australian reporter Ben Sandilands has published an extraordinary visual and technical account of the damage sustained by VH-OQA when its number two Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine suffered an uncontained failure on November 4 six minutes after takeoff from Singapore’s Changi International Airport. Sandilands’ report originates from the preliminary Airbus assessment for the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigation into incident aboard Qantas Flight 32.

The document’s authenticity has been confirmed by Airbus.

The explosion, now traced to an excessive oil build up in the intermediate and high pressure turbines of the Trent 900 engine, caused engine debris to be violently expelled into the surrounding structure of the A380.

Airbus has grouped the damage to VH-OQA in several main areas,
including to “perforations” to the aircraft’s wing, which entered in the
bottom skin of the wing and exited the upper skin. Additionally, two
additional perforations were sustained to the lower panel of the wing, as well as the belly fairing and inboard flap track fairings.

The first, and larger, of two major punctures was suffered by the droop nose 2 on the wing’s leading edge structure. In the line of fire was the drive motor for the droop nose which was “badly damaged” and “seems ot [sic] have been on the direct path of trajectory through the wing.” The debris entered in front of wing rib 13 on the lower panel and exited at the topskin just in front of rib 12.
 
The second major puncture came as engine debris tore into the lower side of the droop nose panel, and continued its path through the front wing spar (CATIA rendering pictured above). As the debris transited the A380’s wing structure, a fuel pipe and wiring were severed near wing rib 9 where it exited.

Additionally, the lower skin on wing panel 1 was punctured in two locations, causing a leak in the A380’s left wing inner tank. The first, was at rib 7 at stringer 0 and the second at rib 10 and stringer 6.

The result of the punctured fuel tank was a steadily increasing imbalance in the aircraft’s center of gravity as the left wing tank emptied its contents over Batam Island.

Immediately following the explosion in the number two engine, the crew was presented with 53 electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) messages, including the confirmed failure of the A380’s green hydraulic system. The severed wiring also appears to have locked out control of engine number one to the crew.

Sandilands addresses the questions of the A380’s system redundancy directly, writing:

“The wing of the jet shows remarkable structural strength in sustaining damage that might have destroyed the airliners of earlier decades, but the questions as to whether control system revisions are necessary to deal with some of the consequences in terms of failed hydraulics and fuel imbalance are said to be very actively under consideration.”

The ATSB plans to release its preliminary factual report on December 3.

ZHUHAI — Few companies on the planet are as disciplined as Boeing with their words, so how the US airframer chooses to express itself can illuminate how the company’s leadership is thinking. Boeing released its third statement Tuesday on the November 9 fire that occurred while ZA002 was on approach to Laredo, Texas. The most important line in the statement at first pass is positive for the 787, taking a glass-half full approach to system redundancy.

“The incident demonstrated many aspects of the safety and redundancy in the 787 design, which ensure that if events such as these occur, the airplane can continue safe flight and landing”.

Morgan Stanley aerospace research analyst, Heidi Wood, reads between the lines, remarking:

“The vagueness alerts us, as it sidesteps claiming the systems all worked. This tells us the multiple redundancies may not have performed as they should have, which dovetails with what our sources have been asserting. We’re impressed by the honest admission; we believe this is an FAA chief concern. “

Exactly what redundancy was not provided after the P100 panel failed is unclear at this point, but Wood does not expect the flight test fleet to return to testing anytime soon, estimating a December or January resumption of the certification campaign, which “could push first delivery to 2012” with changes to aircraft hardware and software.

ZHUHAI — With six 737s with Boeing’s new Sky Interior now handed over to airlines, the airframer is looking ahead to what’s next and may be turning its attention to updating the narrowbody’s front office.

ZHUHAI — Rolls-Royce, beset by criticism over its public handling of the uncontained failures of its Trent 900 and 1000 engines, has canceled its planned Airshow China show briefing.

The engine-maker offered no explanation for the cancellation, leaving media attending the show only to speculate on its sudden change of plans.

ZHUHAI — It’s very late here in China at the moment. Wanted to do a very quick post on ZA001 and ZA005 heading home to Boeing Field from Rapid City, South Dakota and Victorville, California, respectively. Following the ferry flights to BFI, the fleet will remain grounded. Flightglobal has the latest details on the ZA002 fire investigation.

ZHUHAI — At a briefing and announcement at Air Show China Tuesday morning, Comac announced an order for 100 narrowbody C919 aircraft to Air China, China Southern, China Eastern, Hainan Airlines, CBD Leasing and GECAS.

While foreign journalists were banned from the event hosted by state-owned aircraft maker Comac, a side door was left ajar prior to the commencement of the event. Though it was staffed with a police officer, some journalists, includling this one, were provided an unobstructed view of a marketing film for the C919 produced by Comac. Most notably was the presentation of the latest specifications of the new aircraft, but also featured six models that are planned.

These models included the single-class 168-seat (156-seat two class) baseline model, as well as stretched, shrunken, freighter, business configuration and “special” variants. With these plans revealed, Comac’s six models appear to be readying for competition against Boeing’s 737-700, -700C, -900ER, BBJ and Airbus A319, A321, A320P2F and ACJ.