This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
Boeing firmed its schedule for the 787’s service ready, operation and validation (SROV) testing schedule today, readying ZA002 to fly to Tokyo’s Haneda Airport and visit airports in southwestern Japan from July 4 to 8. The company has also ruled out a July first delivery to All Nippon Airways, placing the first handover in August or September.
Here we’re going to take one of the flight test airplanes. In fact, it’s Airplane number two…that airplane will go over to Japan and we’ll actually induct that airplane into ANA’s operating system.
We will fly the airplane with ANA pilots shoulder-to-shoulder, we’ll maintain the airplane with ANA maintainers shoulder-to-shoulder. It will be inducted into their maintenance systems. We’ll demonstrate the ability to dispatch the airplane. We’ll demonstrate the ability to maintain the airplane and we’ll simulate really off-nominal maintenance conditions, whether it’s a major structural failure, a major engine failure, to make sure that the partner team, led by Boeing and ANA, are ready to accept and operate the airplane within their systems.
And we get to a milestone that we call our Program Statement of Compliance or PSOC. This is where The Boeing Company states that the airplane is compliant with the Federal Aviation regulations and that we’ve submitted the last of the documentation necessary for certification. The FAA then reviews – does a final review of that documentation, issues the type certification and we move to delivering the first airplane to ANA in the coming quarter.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
A lot of people ask the question, well, is the re-engined A320 getting traction with your customers? And if you look at the airplane or the airline market out there, most people either have Boeing products or Airbus products. The people that have mixed fleets are the ones who have come together through acquisitions and mergers or the Chinese, where they bought both types of airplanes. And there’s a very high cost of switching. And there’s also a cost for complexity and I really don’t think that we’re going to see too many customers really think about switching to a different type of airplane any time soon.
Airbus’ John Leahy has publicly stated that he believes if Boeing “loses” a solid 737 customer, specifically naming Delta Air Lines, Boeing would be “forced” to re-engine. Buckingham reports in the May 3 BCC research note that Boeing may no-bid Delta, largely due to the inability to offer production slots (Boeing’s 737 line is sold out to 2016/17); there is, therefore, nothing for Boeing to “lose.”
Yet, Albaugh’s comment underscores a possible emerging strategic advantage with the A320neo even if Boeing chooses not to compete for the Delta order. Airbus may be able to gain traction in mixed fleets, but can Boeing? The A320neo’s 95% part commonality does not unlock the current Airbus customer base allowing it to look elsewhere, though Airbus has positioned itself for modest marketshare growth to re-fleet one of the world’s largest carriers and the Chinese market.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
March 27, 2009:
Embraer to decide on larger aircraft within 18 to 24 months
Embraer expects to decide whether to move forward with development of a larger commercial aircraft within the next 18 to 24 months.During an earnings conference call today, Embraer president and CEO Frederico Fleury Curado said: “We keep looking into the whole section of commercial aircraft [from] small to 150 seats or so.”
Embraer in engine talks as it studies clean-sheet airliner
Embraer is talking to General Electric, Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney about new-generation engines to power a potential clean-sheet airliner design under study which is larger than the E-Jet family, a top Embraer official reveals.
…
However, while P&W “started this race with the geared turbofan, and GE and Rolls are very seriously looking at new technology for a new generation engine”, Embraer does not see “enough maturity to make a decision at this point”, says Kern, adding: “Maybe in 18 to 24 months we’ll have a better, more clearer view about that.”
Proposed stretch dubbed E-195X by Embraer
A proposed stretch of Embraer’s largest-capacity commercial jet has been dubbed the E-195X by the manufacturer, which expects to decide whether to launch the variant – or potentially another type – by mid-2011.
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Embraer’s “best estimate” is that it will have a decision on whether to launch a new derivative or programme in “12 to 18 months”, by the mid-2011 timeframe.
March 15, 2010:
Embraer outlines timeframe for new product decision
Embraer expects to make a decision on product enhancements or a new commercial aircraft in 12-18 months.
Company EVP of the airline market Mauro Kern outlined that timeframe during the ISTAT annual conference today in Orlando, Florida, stating the time period to make a decision “could be shorter than that”.
Embraer to decide on new jet in 12-18 months-report
(Reuters) – Embraer (EMBR3.SA)(ERJ.N), the world’s biggest regional aircraft maker, will take more than one year to decide whether to build a new family of jets, Chief Executive Officer Frederico Curado told newspaper Valor Economico on Wednesday.“We have to make a decision in the short to medium term, and that would be something between 12 and 18 months,” Curado told Valor. The Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil-based company is a global leader in 70-to-120-seat aircraft.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
Apologies for the lack of content here the past two weeks, I’ve been mostly ‘heads down’ working on features for our Paris air show issue.
The Package B engine includes a revised six-stage low pressure turbine (LPT) design, high-aspect-ratio blades, relocation of the intermediate-pressure (IP) compressor bleed offtake ports and a fan outlet guide vanes with improved aerodynamics.
ZA001 through ZA004 will conduct their respective first flights using the current Package A standard engine, while ZA004 will have its engines swapped out with the Package B engine during the middle of next year for ETOPS testing.
The Trent 1000 engines featured on the fifth and sixth 787s delivered to All Nippon Airways are expected to feature specific fuel consumption within 1% of targets set by Rolls-Royce.
Further, a Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 newsletter published on the company’s website in March 2010 – three months later – calls the Package B engine the “EIS performance standard”, suggesting that the Package A engines would never see commercial service.

This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
The World Trade Organization appellate body released today a final ruling on the 2004 Airbus launch aid complaint filed by the US on behalf of Boeing. Flightglobal’s reporting on the ruling deputy editor Kerry Reals and mylsef was titled WTO appellate body partially upholds Airbus subsidy ruling, capturing the reaction of the US and European, along with both Boeing and Airbus. To read the complete statements from Boeing and Airbus, you could easily get a very different impression of the final result of the complaint.
The Boeing take: The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body today confirmed that Airbus received $18 billion in illegal “launch aid” and other subsidies from European governments.
The Airbus take: The World Trade Organization (WTO) report released today constitutes the final blow to the Boeing-sponsored myth that government support to Airbus somehow caused harm to Boeing.
As often happens, the appellate ruling is far more ambiguous and far from clear cut. Though what is clear is that neither Boeing nor Airbus interpretations of the ruling leave room for nuance, beyond the rhetorical battle. The war of words being what it is, I wanted to step past press releases from airframers and the statements of government officials and provide access to both the summary of the ruling (below) directly from the WTO, a way to read the complete appellate ruling (PDF) and the original October 2004 complaint and complete June 2010 report that inspired the appeal.
Summary of key findings
The Appellate Body today upheld the Panel’s finding that certain subsidies provided by the European Union and certain Member state governments to Airbus are incompatible with Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement because they have caused serious prejudice to the interests of the United States. The principal subsidies covered by the ruling include financing arrangements (known as “Launch Aid” or “Member state financing”) provided by France, Germany, Spain, and the UK for the development of the A300, A310, A320, A330/A340, A330-200, A340-500/600, and A380 LCA projects. The ruling also covers certain equity infusions provided by the French and German governments to companies that formed part of the Airbus consortium. Additionally, it covers certain infrastructure measures provided to Airbus, namely, the lease of land at the Mühlenberger Loch industrial site in Hamburg, the right to exclusive use of an extended runway at Bremen airport, regional grants by the German authorities in Nordenham, and Spanish government grants and regional grants by Andalucia and Castilla-La Mancha in Sevilla, La Rinconada, Toledo, Puerto Santa Maria, and Puerto Real. The Appellate Body found that the effect of the subsidies was to displace exports of Boeing single-aisle and twin-aisle LCA from the European Union, Chinese, and Korean markets and Boeing single-aisle LCA from the Australian market. Moreover, the Appellate Body confirmed the Panel’s determination that the subsidies caused Boeing to lose sales of LCA in the campaigns involving the A320 (Air Asia, Air Berlin, Czech Airlines, and easyJet), A340 (Iberia, South African Airways, and Thai Airways International), and A380 (Emirates, Qantas, and Singapore Airlines) aircraft.
However, for different reasons, the Appellate Body excluded certain measures from the scope of the finding of serious prejudice. In particular, the finding under Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement no longer includes the 1998 transfer of a 45.76% interest in Dassault Aviation to Aérospatiale; the special purpose facilities at the Mühlenberger Loch industrial site in Hamburg, Aéroconstellation industrial site and associated facilities (taxiways, parking, etc.) in Toulouse, or the various research and technology development (R&TD) measures that had been challenged by the United States (Spanish PROFIT Programme, grants under Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth EC Framework Programmes; 1986-1993 R&TD grants by French government; Luftfahrtforschungsprogramm I, II, and III German grants; grants by Bavarian, Bremen, and Hamburg authorities; civil aircraft research and development and aeronautics research programmes by the UK government). The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel’s findings of displacement in Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, and Chinese Taipei, and of threat of displacement in India.
Moreover, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel’s views on when subsidies can be considered as being de facto contingent upon anticipated export performance. Consequently, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings that the financing provided by Germany, Spain and the UK to develop the A380 was contingent upon anticipated exportation and thus a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body also rejected the United States’ cross-appeal of the Panel finding that it had not been established that certain other member State financing contracts constituted prohibited export subsidies. As a consequence, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s recommendation that the European Union withdraw prohibited subsidies within 90 days. The Appellate Body also found that the United States’ claims regarding an alleged unwritten launch aid/member State financing programme were outside its jurisdiction. In addition, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings regarding the rate of return that a market lender would have demanded for launch aid/member State financing loans because they were not based on an objective assessment; but found that a benefit was conferred even on the basis of the European Union’s calculations. Finally, with respect to the actionable subsidies that have been found to cause adverse effects to the interests of the United States, the Panel’s recommendation that the European Union “take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or … withdraw the subsidy” stands.
The Panel in this case was established in July 2005. The Panel circulated its Report to WTO Members on 30 June 2010; and the European Union filed a Notice of Appeal on 21 July 2010.
A separate dispute brought by the European Union against the United States for subsidies allegedly provided to Boeing is currently before the Appellate Body. The panel report in that dispute was circulated to WTO Members on 31 March 2011. Both the European Union and the United States have appealed aspects of that panel report.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.
Amazingly even with this massive increase in fuel the average domestic fare in the last ten years has only risen $1.81 since 2000 to $316.27 (adjusted for inflation), illustrating the dearth of pricing power airlines have when it comes to managing their ticketing revenue stream. This fact should illustrate why ancillary revenue has become such a core component to achieving the thinnest of margins.
This post was originally published to the internet between 2007 and 2012. Links, images, and embedded media from that era may no longer function as intended.
This post originally appeared at Flightglobal.com from 2007 to 2012.